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COMMENTS
ALASKAN NATIVE INDIAN VILLAGES: THE
QUESTION OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary of Alaska is confronted with independent Native
Indian groups demanding enforcement of claims to sovereign rights.'
Despite numerous opportunities afforded in recent cases, the Alas-
kan courts have been unwilling to rule directly on this issue.2
© 1988 by Paul A. Matteoni
1. Any analysis of Indian law requires an understanding of specific terms.
The term "Indian" has no uniform definition. It varies according to the various tribes
and/or statutes involved. Examples include the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) which de-
fines "Indian" to mean a person of one-half or more Indian blood, but does not require stand-
ing in a recognized tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1982). The Indian Self-Determination Assistance
Act, in comparison, requires tribal membership. Indian Self-Determination and Education As-
sistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(a) (1982).
"Indian country" is an Indian reservation, dependent Indian community, or allotment. 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). "Indian reservation" has no statutory definition. The modern meaning
refers to lands set aside under federal protection for the residence of tribal Indians. See F.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 34 (1982).
"Indian sovereignty" refers to powers of self-government retained by Indian tribes and
neither explicitly limited by treaty or federal statute nor inherently inconsistent with the fed-
eral-tribe relationship. Thus, Indian sovereignty paradoxically depends upon the federal gov-
ernment to grant it recognition. Because Indian sovereignty can be limited by treaty or federal
statute, it is characterized as "limited sovereignty." Indian sovereignty is also characterized as
"inherent" and "retained" because it consists of the original and remaining powers of self-
government. Id. at 235.
The most important principle in American Indian law is "inherent sovereignty." This
concept provides that Indian tribes retain inherent powers of self-government that are not
explicitly limited by the federal government. See generally F. COHEN, supra, at 232-41.
2. Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, No. S-1345 (Alaska
May 20, 1988) (case recently decided by the Alaskan Supreme Court in which an Alaskan
Native village claims immunity from suit in an action brought against it by a private party for
breach of contract); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977) (the court declared the
Metlakata Indian Community, a group of Indians originally from Canada, to possess tribal
status); Cogo v. Central Council of Tlingit & Haida Indians, 465 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Alaska
1979) (court held that the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians, an organization
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These Alaskan Native Indian groups believe they are entitled to
the identical rights, privileges, and protections acknowledged to exist
for the benefit of Native entities throughout the remaining forty-nine
states.' The primary conflict concerns whether the Alaskan Native
groups should be given the same standing afforded "recognized" In-
dian tribes throughout the United States. The precise problem arises
due to difficulty in interpreting the intent of federal Indian legisla-
tion with regard to the Alaskan Native groups. These aboriginal
peoples, organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
continue in their attempts to assert authority over various areas of
tribal and Indian society. 5
An example of a customary claim of sovereign authority as-
serted by these Alaskan Native groups is found in a case recently
ruled upon by the Alaskan Supreme Court.6 In this case, a small
Native village, incorporated under the IRA, entered into a binding
contract with a private consulting/engineering firm. The contract
called for the private firm to organize and assist in the implementa-
tion of electric, sewer, and water projects for the village. These
projects were supported by both federal and state funds.'
designated by federal law to administer judgment funds awarded to those Indians, was im-
mune from suit, but was an organization specifically provided for by federal statute and not a
group of Alaskan Natives residing in a single village); Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457
F. Supp. 384 (D. Alaska 1978) (the parties stipulated that the Chilkat Indian village council
possessed sovereign immunity from suit).
3. Cases recognizing immunity from suit include: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Turner v. United States,
248 U.S. 354 (1919); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 757
F.2d 1047 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 474 U.S. 9 (1985). This principle of tribal immunity from suit
has long been held to apply to suits brought to enforce contracts against tribes. See Thebo v.
Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895); American Indian Agricultural Credit
Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1985); Ramey Con-
str. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1982).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982). The Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, ch.
576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982)) [hereinaf-
ter IRA], was an attempt to encourage economic development, self-determination, cultural plu-
rality, and a revival of tribalism. "The IRA was intended to provide a mechanism for the tribe
as a governmental unit to interact with and adapt to modern society, rather than to force the
assimilation of individual Indians." F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 147.
5. See supra note 1. See also Indian Self-Determination Act which declares that "It]he
Indian people will never surrender their desire to control their relationship both among them-
selves and with non-Indian government, organizations, and persons." 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(2)
(1976).
6. Native Village of Stevens, No. S-1345 (Alaska 1988).
7. The state and federal levels provide funds for the improvement of water and electric
systems in the outlying areas of Alaska. These funds are often distributed on the basis of a
Native group's need, and also require recognition as an IRA entity.
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After substantial performance of the contract by the private con-
sulting firm the agreement was unilaterally terminated by the Native
village. The private firm sought judgment against the Native village
for breach of contractual obligations. The village answered the alle-
gations by claiming immunity from suit due to lack of jurisdiction of
the Alaskan courts. The Native village council claimed its own inde-
pendent jurisdiction over any actions brought against it as a legal
entity. The village's defense is an attempt to utilize the established
precedent recognizing that tribal governments maintain many of the
attributes and privileges of self-government. Among these rights is
the power to adjudicate claims brought against the Native group as a
legal entity and, in many instances, the right to claim complete im-
munity from suit.8
This issue of whether Alaskan Native groups are entitled to
sovereign rights9 remains alive and unsettled. This comment exam-
ines the intent of the United States Congress regarding whether sov-
ereignty should be granted to these particular groups. Specifically,
this is a review of governmental legislation in the Indian sovereign
rights area, with a discussion of its application to the Native groups
of Alaska.
Section II of this comment explores the traditional "tribe-Indian
country" analysis"0 which has been used consistently by jurisdictions
other than Alaska for determining Native groups' claims of sovereign
authority, Section III presents the issue of sovereign rights11 with
regard to Alaskan Native Indian villages. Section IV examines
whether application of the traditional "tribe-Indian country" test to
Alaskan Native Indian villages leads to full and fair enforcement of
legislative intent and correspondingly provides for consistent judicial
results.
8. See supra notes I and 3 and accompanying text.
9. Sovereign rights refer to the power of a recognized Native entity to enforce laws and
adjudicate claims within its territory. See supra note I and accompanying text. See infra notes
11-13 and accompanying text.
10. The "tribe-Indian country" test is the traditional two-part analysis that has been
applied by jurisdictions nationwide in determining whether a Native Indian group, village, or
the like, should be granted sovereign recognition. The fundamental premise is that a Native
group, vying for sovereign recognition, must establish both (1) status as a federally recognized
tribe, and (2) occupation of some type of "Indian .country."
11. The dictionary defines "sovereign" as "one that exercises supreme authority within
a limited sphere." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1128 (1983 ed.). For
the purposes of this comment, the word "sovereignty" refers to the "inherent political indepen-
dence" to which some Native groups are entitled, and the term "exercise of sovereignty" refers
to various powers that a sovereign may attempt to exercise. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 246-
57.
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II. THE "TRIBE-INDIAN COUNTRY" ANALYSIS
For decades groups of Native Americans have attempted to as-
sert their right to sovereign powers. Since the invasion and domina-
tion of Alaska by white settlers, Indian groups have continued to
claim authority to govern particular areas of their lives. Generally,
these groups have claimed the power to adjudicate their own internal
disputes and to regulate the affairs of those who claim membership
in their group.12
Additionally, many Native groups have commonly claimed im-
munity from all outside actions. 3 This claim of complete immunity
is roughly analogous to that of an independent nation's government
claiming immunity from suit.' 4 The basic maxim is that formal, rec-
ognized, governmental entities are to be considered sovereign and
thereby afforded all the rights, powers and protections of such a
position. 5
The United States Congress has addressed the claims of these
Indian groups in a variety of instances. 6 Numerous statutes and
other legislative doctrines manifest governmental recognition that
sovereign rights, powers and protections do exist.'1 Through this leg-
islation, and its corresponding case law, criteria have been developed
for determining a Native group's standing to claim such privileges.
Those groups of Natives who have met the established requirements
have been formally recognized as possessing sovereignty, and in turn,
all of its accompanying benefits and burdens."
The federal government acknowledges that certain Native
groups have met the standards necessary for recognition as a formal
12. Native tribes retain sovereign authority over their own peoples only to an extent
which does not interfere with the United States' exercise of its own sovereign powers. This
subjects the preexisting Native authority to a political state referred to as "suzerainty."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled, Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
13. "The immunity bars any suits against the tribe, but bars suits against individual
members of the governing body only when an adverse judgment would interfere with the gov-
erning council of the tribe." Myers, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1058, 1059-60 (1982). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 4.
15. The maxim is best exemplified by the following passage:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of deci-
sions, is that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not,
in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather
"inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."
F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 231 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-23).
16. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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sovereign entity." Even with formal recognition established, it is im-
portant to note that a Native group's sovereign powers are usually
limited in both scope and authority."0
To be granted even limited authority, a Native group must first
fulfill certain fundamental criteria. The statutes and case law to be
examined herein cite three formal criteria recognized in securing a
claim of sovereign power: (a) the group of Natives must be recog-
nized as a "tribe"" under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA); (b)
the recognized tribe must occupy "Indian country;"' and (c) any
sovereign powers which a tribe's council may possess can be limited
in scope and authority. 8
Native Indian groups which can establish themselves as a
"tribe" and also establish their domain upon "Indian country" have
fulfilled the necessary elements for recognition as a sovereign entity.
The following is an examination of these requirements.
A. Recognition as a Tribe Under the IRA
It is well documented that particular groups of Natives have
been federally recognized as "tribes."' 4 These tribes were formally
acknowledged under the original definition of the IRA (Wheeler-
19. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
20. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 277-78, 350.
21. "Indian tribe" does not have a uniform legal 'definition. The Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, however, relies upon the definition noted in Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261
(1901). "By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in
a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though some-
times ill-defined territory .. " F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 266.
Federal law generally focuses on tribes and their members, rather than on Indians as a
racial minority. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (employment
establishment preference statute is constitutionally applicable only to tribal members). Some
exceptions do exist however, such as the criminal jurisdiction statute for Indian country, which
uses the term "Indian" without specifically limiting it to tribe members. See 18 U.S.C. §§
1152-1153 (1982).
A general definition was laid out in Montoya, 180 U.& at 266. "By a 'tribe' we under-
stand a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community under one leader-
ship or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory. . ....
Id.
22. For a definition of "Indian country," see supra note 1.
23. Different rules apply to tribal jurisdictions than to traditional government jurisdic-
tions. On reservations the presumption is that tribal governments have exclusive jurisdiction
except where Congress has not prohibited state regulation and it does not interfere with tribal
government. Outside reservations, state jurisdiction applies to Native people to the same extent
as to non-Natives. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 6. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411
U.S. at 148-49; South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 877-78 (D. Alaska
1979).
24. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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Howard Act). 5 These groups were defined as tribes in light of their
ability to distinguish themselves from mere gatherings, societies, or
voluntary associations." Tribes are political bodies which maintain
and possess all the functions and powers of a formal government.7
Conversely, Native groups that fail to establish themselves as tribes
are not afforded the right to establish their own independent
governments.
Recognition as a tribe is directly linked to recognition as a polit-
ical body. Four factors are analyzed in determining the validity of a
Native group's claim as an autonomous political entity: (1) whether
the Native group represents an historical tribe;" (2) whether the
Native group satisfies the legal definitions of a tribe;29 (3) whether
the Native group satisfies the case law definitions of a tribe; 0 and
(4) whether the Native group has been recognized by the IRA as a
tribe."
1. Historical Legitimacy
The initial factor in determining a Native group's tribal status
is the establishment of historical legitimacy. The year in which a
Native group's governing council was created is the prime element to
consider in the analysis of a tribe's historical legitimacy. The federal
government requires formal documentation substantiating a Native
group's claim as an historical tribe.3
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) came into effect in 1934.
A tribal council created after 1934 merely to fulfill the conditions of
the IRA, in hope of securing formal recognition as a tribe, lacks
25. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
26. UNITED STATES SOLICITOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 462 (1958).
27. Id.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 32-43.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 52-57.
32. Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian
Tribe, 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1988).
§ 54.7 Form and Content of Petition:
(a) A statement of facts establishing that the petitioner has been identified from
historical times until the present on a substantially continuous basis, as "Ameri-
can Indian" or "aboriginal" . . . .
(c) A statement of facts which establishes that the petitioner has maintained
tribal political influence or other authority over its members as an autonomous
entity throughout history until the present.
Id. (emphasis added).
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historical foundation. The lack of an early governing council is usu-
ally considered substantial evidence that no continuous and control-
ling governmental authority existed throughout the Native group's
history."
When no acknowledged political authority has been recognized
by the Native entity's members, the group is deemed to have existed
without structured organization.84 In situations where no formal
laws, guidelines or restrictions were maintained by established gov-
erning bodies, research indicates that the groups were organized into
villages, not into tribes.3" No federal recognition as a tribe has been
afforded where want of an historical self-governing unit is
apparent.8 6
The federal government has acknowledged that certain Native
groups possess historical legitimacy. These groups have been ac-
knowledged in a published list of officially recognized tribes." The
initial list was published in 1978 when the Secretary of the Interior
announced the definition that Native groups must satisfy to be recog-
nized in the Federal Register as a recognized tribe. 8
Congress further distinguished historical tribes from non-tribes
by adding a supplemental list in 1982."' This new portion of the
33. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 14, 350-52.
34. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 14, 350-52.
35. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 14, 350-52.
36. Congress may, however, in an exercise of its constitutional authority over Indians,
delegate certain specific governmental roles to Indian entities regardless of tribal status. For
example, under the Indian Child Welfare Act, an Alaskan Native village may exercise limited
authority over child welfare cases after it receives approval of its adjudication system from the
Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903, 1911 (1982). However, those powers dele-
gated by statute apply only to the extent necessary to carry out the initiative in question and do
not amount to recognized sovereign authority. To do this the group need not be a tribe nor
occupy Indian country.
37. The Secretary of the Interior's "List of Recognized Tribes," 47 Fed. Reg. 53,130
(1982). The Secretary of the Interior has a duty to publish this "recognized list of tribes." 25
C.F.R. § 83.6(b) (1986).
The actual list is too lengthy to provide in whole. The list includes all officially recognized
tribes across the entire United States.
38. The original section 16 definition for recognition as a "tribe" is:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the
right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate consti-
tution and by-laws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority
vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such
reservation, as the case may be, at a special election authorized and called by the
Secretary of the Interior under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe. . ..
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982) (emphasis added).
39. The 1982 amendment to the IRA provided application of the statute to Alaska. It
provides: "[Tihat groups of Indians in Alaska not recognized prior to May 1, 1936, as bands
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statute provides for a broader definition of recognized Native entities,
thereby establishing a separate list of groups recognized solely as
IRA entities, as compared to tribal entities.'0
Those groups that qualify for IRA status by the supplemental
definition have been allowed to receive federal benefits and support.
However, recognition as full sovereign tribal entities was not af-
forded.' 1 By providing for two separate lists the federal government
appears to have expressed its intent to differentiate between mere
IRA status under the supplemental definition and complete tribal
status under the original definition.
Courts throughout the lower 48 states and Hawaii' have
adopted this "IRA status" versus "tribal status" differentiation. Only
those Native entities recognized as possessing historical legitimacy
can be considered for tribal status. An IRA council, organized in
modern times to secure recognition (in order to receive federal sup-
port), has failed to meet the criteria necessary for formal tribal sta-
tus. A Native group cannot acquire historical legitimacy by simply
organizing an IRA council.' Unbroken authority must have existed
throughout the evolution of the Indian group.
2. Legal Requirements
The second factor to analyze in determining formal tribal status
is the fulfillment of the legal requirements. The legal requirements
for formal recognition as a tribe are statutorily defined by federal
legislation." These requirements have been thoroughly adopted by
subsequent case law.' 5 The criteria required for legal recognition in-
or tribes, but having a 'common bond' of occupation, association, or residence within a well
defined neighborhood, community, or rural district, may organize to adopt constitutions. . ....
(emphasis added) 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1982).
40. Id.
41. The supplemental definition calls only for a "common bond" uniting the Natives.
This is a significant expansion of the original definition which required "tribes or bands" of
Indians. The end result is that IRA status is recognized for "all the Natives in an area organ-
ized solely for business purposes. Still others included persons with a common bond of occupa-
tion, such as cooperatives composed of fishermen in an area." F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 751.
42. The term "lower 48 states and Hawaii" is a phrase utilized by the Alaskan people
to denote the remainder of the United States.
43. IRA status is not the equivalent of tribal status. Alaskan aboriginal people were
loyal, historically, to the family or clan. This is not equivalent to political loyalty which is a
necessity for tribal status, and not necessary for IRA status. There existed no village-wide
structure or government to Which individuals paid allegiance. See K. OBERG, THE SOCIAL
ECONOMY OF THE TLINGIT INDIANS 39, 48-49, 61 (1973).
44. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1982).
45. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury
Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 583-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Board of Equaliza-
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elude: (a) a private, voluntary organization; (b) a continuing, organ-
ized government; (c) leadership which is followed by a majority of
the people; and (d) composition of a specific Native people, not a
blend of differing Native groups into one entity."
These four requirements for legal recognition are combined
with the historical legitimacy requirement. Relying upon both quali-
fications, courts may then consider whether a contemporary associa-
tion of related Indians has been formed or if the group claiming tri-
bal status has exercised political influence over its members as an
"autonomous entity throughout history until the present." '47
3. Case Law Requirements
The legal requirements developed by Congress are not an ex-
clusive list of criteria. The judiciary, through developing case law,
has recognized five additional factors to assist in determining a Na-
tive Indian group's tribal status. These factors include: (1) whether
the group has treaty relations with the United States; (2) whether
the group has been formally denominated a "tribe" by an act of
Congress or an executive order; (3) whether the group has been
treated as a tribe by other established tribes; (4) whether the group
has exercised continuous political authority over its members; and
(5) whether the groups members share collective rights in tribal
lands and/or funds.48
Case law recognizes that tribal status may be obtained by meet-
ing the defined federal standards.49 However, these standards are
rigid and tend to be slanted toward the historical legitimacy require-
ments.5" The judiciary has developed these five additional factors in
an attempt to assist courts in alleviating the bias.
It is important to note that federal statutes have allowed certain
tion v. Alaska Native Brotherhood & Sisterhood, 666 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1983).
46. See supra note 44.
47. Price v. Hawaii, 764 F.2d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Hou Hawaiians v.
Hawaii, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(c) (1982)). For a
complete discussion, see infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
48. Price, 764 F.2d at 623. All five factors were developed and examined in Price.
49. The Price court determined that a Native group could also obtain tribal status by
meeting the criteria set forth by the Secretary of the Interior at 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1978)
(formerly 25 C.F.R. § 52). Price, 764 F.2d at 626-27. See supra notes 44-47 and accompany-
ing text.
50. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (1988) (requiring historical continuity, not formation in modern
times); 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(c) (1988) (requiring political authority over members throughout
history until the present).
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Native groups an exemption from the federal standards.61 Therefore,
some Native groups on the aforementioned Secretary of the Interior's
"list of recognized entities" may be exempt from the federal require-
ments. However, these qualified exemptions do not grant such
groups sovereign powers. These exemptions are merely loopholes
whereby recognized groups of Natives can maintain a position simi-
lar to an IRA entity and thereby become eligible to receive federal
Indian benefits. The exempt groups are not recognized tribes and,
therefore, maintain no claim of sovereign authority.
Furthermore, the requirements regarding this "benefits" list are
not as stringent as those implemented for tribal recognition. The two
lists were intended to be considered separately. Holding that the two
distinct definitions have identical meaning would be an inappropriate
interpretation of legislative intent. There is no apparent reason for
two separate definitions if Congress intended them to be considered
identical.
The combination of the historical legitimacy requirement, legal
requirements, and case law requirements provide courts with a solid
foundation upon which to base decisions regarding tribal status.
Courts which have thoroughly addressed the tribal sovereignty issue
have used these three guidelines to simplify the sovereign rights
question.
4. IRA Status
The last factor to consider in determining tribal status is the
establishment of IRA status by a Native group. The original defini-
tion for IRA status is set forth in section 16 of the Act.52 Section 16
restricts those Native groups that may adopt constitutions for incor-
poration to those who fulfill the definition. The definition provides
that only those "bands or tribes" of Indians living on reservations
shall be recognized as tribes and afforded applicable sovereign pow-
ers."3 These are the only entities whose incorporation under the IRA
denotes approval of tribal status.54
51. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b) (1988) provides:
Evidence that a substantial portion of the petitioning group inhabits a specific
area or lives in a community viewed as American Indian and distinct from other
populations in the area, and that its members are descendants of an Indian tribe
which historically inhabited a specific area.
id.
52. See supra note 38.
53. See supra note 38.
54. See supra notes 37-41.
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Once recognized under the original IRA provisions, a group is
formally and officially established as a tribe. As previously noted, an
amendment to the original provision was adopted in 1982." 5 Recog-
nition by the subsequent amendment to the Act does not embellish
the same high standard as the original provision. The amendment
calls only for a "common bond""6 which, in some manner, ties the
group together. The amendment provides that recognition is all that
is needed to receive government funds constituting economic assis-
tance. Tribal status does not need to be established to receive the
funds.
An IRA council formed under the amendment to the act does
not satisfy the same definition as provided in the original provision.
Only those entities which are actual "bands or tribes" can meet the
original IRA provision required for tribal status.
Native groups which are able to satisfy all four of the above
criteria have been afforded formal recognition as a tribe. This recog-
nition fulfills the initial requirement for asserting sovereign
authority.5
B. The Indian Country Requirement
Recognition of a Native group as a tribe does not automatically
afford that entity the exercise of sovereign powers and privileges. A
recognized tribal entity must also occupy "Indian country" to be ac-
knowledged as possessing sovereign rights.58
Case law has established an "on-reservation/off-reservation"
distinction as an aid to analyzing the "Indian country" require-
ment. 59 Native tribes situated upon reservation lands have been rec-
ognized as possessing rights and privileges common to a sovereign
entity.60  Tribes located upon off-reservation lands lack such
authority. 6
Adhering to this distinction, the federal government has demon-
strated its intent to differentiate between "on" and "off" reservation
Native tribes by consistently refusing to recognize governmental
55. See supra note 39.
56. See supra note 41.
57. For a definition of "Indian country," see supra note 1.
58. See supra notes 1 and 10.
59. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962); Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
60. Kake, 369 U.S. at 65.
61. Id.
19881
886 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
powers in off-reservation Native entities.62 Modern state legislative
enactments have also manifested this intent.6 All reservations are
established through federal authority. Thus, the federal government
has the power to restrict or deny sovereign rights to any Native
group. 64
For Native groups existing outside reservation lands, attempts
to assert sovereign authority have been difficult. Many Native enti-
ties situated upon off-reservation lands have attempted to fulfill the
"Indian country" requirement through a loophole by claiming them-
selves "dependent Indian communities."65 Two leading United
States Supreme Court cases66 addressed the issue of Native villages
which claimed to be dependent Indian communities. These Native
groups sought to be considered the functional equivalents of reserva-
tions, without being designated as such by formal legislation. These
cases considered the issue of whether an Indian community may be
deemed "dependent."
The determining factor in each case was whether Congress in-
tended to recognize the community as residing on a reservation.6 7
Stated in another manner, the issue was whether the Native entities
were set aside under federal supervision for the protection of Indians
62. See The Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(b) (1975); Indian Financ-
ing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1452(c) (1974); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1978);
Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(40)(A) (1983). An example
of the standard disclaimer, taken from the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act, states:
"Nothing in the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, or in the Amendments
made thereby, shall validate or invalidate any claim by Alaska Natives of sovereign authority
over lands or people." Id.
63. Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971);
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, §§ 2 and 6; See IRA, supra note 4; Application to Alaska, 25 U.S.C. §
473(a) (1936); Alaskan Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958); § 3, ch. 44,
Laws of Alaska (1913); Territorial Organic Act, 37 Stat. 512 (1912); and District Organic
Act, 23 Stat. 24 (1884).
64. Congress has plenary authority to recognize tribes, to combine separate ethnological
tribes for the purpose of legal status, and to terminate tribal status. F. COHEN, supra note 1,
ch. 4, at 5-7.
65. "Dependent Indian communities" are recognized as "Indian country" by the federal
government. See supra note 1. The term "dependent Indian community" has been acknowl-
edged and dealt with in two Supreme Court cases. See infra note 66. See also F. COHEN,
supra note 1, at 27-46.
The test for determining whether a "dependent Indian community" exists has been devel-
oped by the judiciary. See United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982). (South Dakota has no jurisdiction over a housing project that is
a dependent Indian community because it is managed by an Indian tribe with independent
sovereign authority).
66. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United States v. McGowan, 302
U.S. 535 (1938).
67. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 37, 39, 41; McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538-39.
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dependent upon the federal government. These two major decisions
established that it is Congress, not the judiciary, which is responsible
for determining whether a particular Native entity shall be recog-
nized as a "dependent Indian village."68 This precedent has been
recognized in a number of state and federal court of appeals cases.69
This type of "dependent Indian community" is extremely rare.
As noted, courts are attempting to determine legislative intent when
a Native group uses this means in trying to substantiate that it occu-
pies "Indian country." In these situations, two strict requirements
must be fulfilled: (1) proof that either federal land held for Indian
use, or tribal land, was specifically set aside for Indian use; and (2)
proof that the setting aside was with the intent of protecting and
caring for the Indians who remain dependent on the federal govern-
ment." The intent of Congress to declare the Native group depen-
dent is again the determining factor. "Dependent Indian commu-
nity" status is unique, unusual, and difficult for Native tribes to
substantiate. Few Native groups have been recognized as dependent
upon the federal government.7 ' Without federal legislation providing
for the establishment of a reservation, a Native group must hope-
lessly struggle to establish dependent Indian village status.
C. Those Sovereign Powers Which Are Granted to a Recognized
Tribe May Be Limited in Scope
Off-reservation sovereign powers are not the equivalent of on-
reservation tribal powers. If tribal status is afforded, and the Native
unit has also been classified as occupying Indian country outside the
boundaries of a reservation, there is still no guarantee of absolute
sovereign power and privilege. No legislative enactment, court deci-
sion, or other recognized authority has ever maintained that Con-
68. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46; McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538-39.
69. United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971); Weddell v. Meierhenry,
636 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981); United States v. South
Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982); Blatchford v. Gon-
zales, 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (N.M. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); State v.
Cutnose, 87 N.M. 299, 532 P.2d 888 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); G. v. State, 594 P.2d 798 (Okla.
Crim. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
70. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
71. Since no precise definition for a "dependent Indian community" exists, supra note
64, and Congress is usually reluctant to grant sovereign authority, few Native groups have
been successful in establishing "Indian country" by this method.
One reason for this is that the "dependent Indian community" category does not refer to
types of land ownership or reservation boundaries, but rather to residential Indian communi-
ties under federal protection. Therefore, establishing the existence of boundaries of a depen-
dent Indian community is difficult. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 27-46.
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gress intended for tribal entities on all types of Indian country to
possess identical governmental powers and privileges. No precedent
establishes such a conclusion. 2
Certain specific sovereign rights have never been protected, even
for a Native tribe occupying reservation Indian land.78 A classic il-
lustration of this limitation on sovereign rights is the inability of a
tribe, located on its own reservation land, to exclude non-Natives.
Even upon authorized reservation lands, a recognized tribal entity
still possesses only limited authority. Yet, those tribes situated upon
reservation lands obviously face a lesser burden in attempting to as-
sert sovereign control.
The fact that no Congressional intent exists for all Indian coun-
try to be considered identical is further illustrated in the authority
which considers Native allotments.74 Allotments are parcels of land
granted by state or federal authority to qualified Native individuals
or corporations. 75 This procedure was used extensively throughout
Alaska via the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).7
These allotments have been recognized as falling under the defi-
nition of "Indian country." However, different rules apply regarding
governmental jurisdiction on allotments than apply on reservation
lands." Native groups situated upon allotments do not possess the
same degree of freedom from state and federal regulation which on-
reservation tribes possess. Affairs which are normally left to be gov-
erned by tribal councils on a reservation are provided for by state
72. This is precisely the reason the Legislature has allowed sovereign powers for Native
tribes primarily when located on reservation lands, or in other unique instances (i.e., depen-
dent Indian communities, allotments, etc.).
It has also been determined that Indian country is recognized as "all lands within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government ....
18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982).
Furthermore, Metlakatla Indians, 369 U.S. 45 (1962), and Kake, 369 U.S. (1962),
manifests the Supreme Court's adoption of the conclusion that only on-reservation Native enti-
ties possess complete sovereign powers.
73. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
74. Allotments, like "dependent Indian communities," are statutorily determined to be
"Indian country." See supra note 1.
75. Id.
76. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) provided large amounts of
monies and lands to the Native people of Alaska. Over 40 million acres of land were given to
Alaskan Natives, as well as nearly one billion dollars in federal grants and mineral revenues.
Fee simple patents for land were issued to the "corporations" which were established to pro-
tect individual interests. Alaskan Natives received these lands and revenues in consideration for
the extinguishment of claims to large areas of Alaskan territory. 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982)). See also F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 746-47, 753-54.
77. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); South Naknek, 466 F. Supp. 870
(D. Alaska 1979). See also F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 277-78, 350.
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regulation on allotments.7 Hence, on these off-reservation tracts,
sovereign power either does not exist, or is very limited.
In summary, when a legitimate tribal entity claims sovereign
rights, the courts are left to examine the specific federal statute(s) or
treatise(s) granting tribal authority and/or limiting state authority.
The threshold question for the courts to determine is whether any
legislation exists which provides for the establishment of a formal
reservation. Absent such legislation, a Native area may still be classi-
fied as a dependent Indian community, allotment, or other Indian
country. Accordingly, only those applicable rights and privileges that
correlate with the type of Indian country occupied will be granted.
III. DEFINITION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The establishment of (1) tribal status, and (2) occupation of a
recognized type of Indian country, provides a Native Indian group
with a foundation upon which to base its claim to sovereign rights.
This procedure for establishing sovereign authority has been recog-
nized in those states which have dealt with this issue.7 9
Although the issue of sovereignty for Alaskan Native Indian
groups has repeatedly reached the Alaska Supreme Court, to date it
remains unresolved.80 An unwillingness to address this problem has
become apparent.8 ' In all probability, nonresolution of the issue is
on account of two factors: (1) the state judiciary's desire to prevent
alienation and hostility on the part of the Alaskan Native groups;
and (2) the state judiciary's desire not to relinquish possible state
authority over Alaskan lands to federal jurisdiction. 2 Alaskan ab-
original peoples are historically tied to their lands. They have re-
tained a serious commitment to protect the rights and privileges of
their ancestors. In contrast, the state, as a political entity, desires to
retain jurisdiction over as vast an area as possible within its borders.
The Alaskan courts have been understandably tentative.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 3 and 69.
80. See supra note 2.
81. See supra note 2.
82. The people of Alaska are strong and vocal advocates of state control over state af-
fairs. There is a strong push to rid Alaska of federal control over state lands. See Alaska
Statehood Commission Act of July 2, 1980, AS Temp. Sec. Sp., ch. 161, § 1 (1984); see also
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist stated that the 10th
Amendment limits federal control over states and held that the federal government was infring-
ing on the state's power to make decisions concerning distribution of state services). Id. at 843;
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
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The specific issue confronting the Alaskan Supreme Court is
whether to deny these Native groups the sovereign rights they claim.
The problem has arisen due to these Alaskan Native entities' inabil-
ity to unequivocally meet either criterion of the traditional "tribe-
Indian country" test. As the following analysis indicates, many of the
Alaskan Native Indian groups were neither formed as tribes (politi-
cal entities) under the traditional historic or legal definitions, nor do
they occupy recognized "Indian country." This failure to satisfy ei-
ther of the established requirements has left the Alaskan judiciary in
the precarious position of having to deny sovereign powers to the
state's numerous Native Indian groups.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL "TRIBE-INDIAN
COUNTRY" TEST TO THE ALASKAN NATIVE GROUPS
Congress has afforded recognized tribal entities a vast array of
powers. Though it is customary for federal authorities to limit these
powers to some extent,8" these tribes have retained all the inherent
powers necessary to conduct their affairs.8 It has become a recurring
scenario in recent years for groups of Native Indians to assert sover-
eign powers.8" Alaskan Native groups have been among the leaders
in this pursuit.8
As previously discussed, statutes and other legislative enact-
ments by the United States government have afforded certain recog-
nized Indian groups tribal status.8" Alaskan Native groups have been
treated differently by the federal government.88 No formal recogni-
tion as a tribe, under the original definition of the IRA, has been
given to any Alaskan Native group.8"
The historical relationship between the United States and the
Alaskan Native groups is characterized as a "special relationship"
between two separate entities.9" The Federal-Native relationship has
83. A prime example of the limits of Indian power is contained in the concept of "suze-
rainty." A suzerain is a dominant political state exercising varying degrees of authority over a
vassal state with regard to its foreign relations but allowing it sovereign authority over its
internal affairs. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1298 (5th ed. 1979); see also Worcester, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) at 515 (detailed description of the cause and effects of suzerainty).
84. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 122. See also Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
85. See supra notes 3, 69, and 77.
86. See supra note 2.
87. See supra note 37.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 95-150.
90. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S.
164 (1973), overruled, Bryan v. Itasca Co., 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
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led to a strong federal involvement in Alaska and a resulting resent-
ment of the federal government by the state. 1 The federal govern-
ment has been recognized as the "guardian" of Alaskan Native In-
dian groups." Though Alaskan groups have retained certain
inherent rights,93 they at all times have remained subject to the ple-
nary powers of the United States Congress.9 4
Whether the Alaskan Native entities are justified in their claim
to sovereign powers is open to examination through the traditional
"tribe-Indian country" analysis. These assertions of sovereign pow-
ers can attempt to be substantiated by fulfilling both the tribal status
and Indian country criteria.
A. Tribal Status of Alaskan Native Indian Groups
As examined previously, both the historical and legal guidelines
must be met in order to substantiate a claim of tribal status.9 These
traditional qualifications have yet to be applied to an Alaskan Native
Indian group claiming sovereign status." These criteria appear ex-
tremely difficult for Alaskan Native groups to satisfy. 7
1. Alaskan Native Groups Fail to Meet Historical Criteria
Initially, Alaskan Native groups face the virtually insurmounta-
ble task of substantiating themselves as historical tribes. These
515 (1832).
91. D. CASE, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OF ALASKAN NATIVES TO THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (1978). See also Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No.
96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
92. United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442 (1905); see also Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); United States v. Cadzow, 5 Alaska 125 (1914).
93. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
94. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 12-78.
96. The Supreme Court of Alaska has continued to avoid resolution of the issue con-
cerning the claim to sovereign rights by the state's numerous Native groups. Other tests to
replace the traditional tribe/Indian country test have been proposed for use in the Alaska
situation. One proposed approach is a "substantive analysis," whereby the court is urged to
examine the Alaskan Native groups independently. This requires that the Alaskan Native
groups be examined in a manner that specifically takes into account how these groups devel-
oped (as clans and families, not. tribes), rather than placing the groups within the traditional
test. Note, Alaska Native Sovereignty: The Limits of the Tribe-Indian Country Test, 17 COR-
NELL INTER. L.J. 375 (1984).
97. There are approximately ninety traditional villages in Alaska governed by tradi-
tional councils. There are approximately seventy IRA governments in the state, giving them
power to form contracts as a legal entity. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION:
SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ALASKAN NATIVE ISSUES 22 (Comm. Print 1977).
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groups have generally developed as unorganized villages.9" Thus, no
voluntary association or society amounting to a political body was
ever maintained throughout the history of these Native groups.
These groups existed primarily as fishing villages or hunting com-
munities, with their primary allegiance to the family or clan, not to
the village as a political entity."
Distinguished authority Felix Cohen, author of The Handbook
of Federal Indian Law,'"0 concludes that Alaskan Native groups
were organized into villages and not tribes.1 'O The federal govern-
ment has followed this historical interpretation with the aforemen-
tioned "list of recognized tribes" in the Federal Register.' 2 No Alas-
kan Native groups were included under the original definition. The
supplemental list, added in 1982, contained many Alaskan Native
groups. However, these Alaskan Native groups were listed sepa-
rately and were not required to meet the same criteria used under
the original definition.' 03
There was a desire to differentiate between recognized historical
tribes and those Native groups which developed as unorganized vil-
lages.'0 4 The federal government has concluded that no historical
tribes were found to exist in Alaska. Congress denied tribal status to
Alaskan Native Indian groups through its list of recognized tribes
based upon these groups' failure to exhibit historical political
allegiance.
2. Alaskan Native Groups Fail to Fulfill Either Legal or
Case Law Criteria
These Alaskan Native Indian groups also face the problem of
meeting the legal criteria established for tribal recognition.' 0 5 As
noted earlier, these legal requirements are specific and provide set
guidelines for courts to follow when determining tribal status.' 6 The
most basic legal requirement, that the group be comprised of a spe-
cific Native people not a collection of differing Native groups, 0 ,
proves very difficult for a majority of these groups to fulfill. Modern
98. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
99. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
100. F. COHEN, supra note 1.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
102. See supra note 37.
103. See supra note 37.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
107. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1982).
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transportation, communication, and the probability of mixed-Native
marriages make it unlikely that a particular group would be com-
prised of a single Native origin.
It is also difficult for a contemporary Alaskan Native entity to
satisfy the case law requirements.'08 Many of these groups do not
share collective rights to tribal land, nor do they share group funds
among their members.' Additionally, in many scenarios continuous
political control has not been continuously exercised over the groups'
members." 0
Finally, the criteria set forth by the Department of the Interior
for recognition as a tribe.' may be the most difficult for these Native
Indian groups to fulfill. These requirements once again lean toward
the historical criteria. Thus, it is doubtful that the majority of Alas-
kan Native groups could meet these qualifications. Any tribal gov-
ernment founded in modern times and lacking an historical basis
would place the Native group outside of this recognized list.
The federal government's criteria have provided two factors that
clearly manifest the Legislature's intent for requiring a formal,
structured tribal government. These factors include historical con-
tinuity, rather than formation in modern times," 2 and political au-
thority over members from historical time until the present."'
As previously discussed, the exemption for Native groups on the
supplemental "list of recognized entities" does not qualify a Native
group as a tribe. The "entities list" merely determines eligibility for
receipt of federal benefits." 4 Alaskan groups on the "entities list"
are eligible for federal government monies and lands in Alaska. The((entities" list contains a number of Alaskan Native groups that are
now defunct, that have existed without exercising political authority
for decades, and/or that simply cannot be interpreted as recognized
tribes. A list naming these groups as eligible for federal services has
never been interpreted by any authority as a list of recognized
tribes."
In addition, it should be noted that no state or Congressional act
has automatically acknowledged Alaskan Native entities as tribes. In
108. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
109. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1982).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 38.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 24-43.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 24-43.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 24-43.
115. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 14.
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a number of statutes Congress has included Alaskan Native villages
in its definition of "tribe," but solely for the purposes of that partic-
ular legislation."1 6 These statutes commonly contain express dis-
claimers for preventing broad interpretation of the tribal status.117
The fact that Congress explicitly extended these laws to entities in
Alaska, through special provisions providing definitions for tribal
status, implies that the Legislature never intended for all Alaskan
Native Indian villages to be afforded general tribal status in all
instances.
3. Alaskan Native Group's IRA Status is Not Tribal Status
Finally, the Alaskan Native Indian groups face equal difficulty
in attempting to argue that recognition as an IRA council is the
equivalent of tribal recognition." 8 With the enactment of the IRA,
many tribes throughout the nation were formally recognized. How-
ever, there were no Alaskan groups recognized as tribes on the origi-
nal Federal Register. The IRA was extended to Alaska in 1939 with
still no tribal recognition afforded Alaskan Native groups.
To fulfill the requirements of IRA status, numerous Native vil-
lage "governments" were created. These governments qualified the
villages for federal lands and monies. Historical governmental pow-
ers had not been maintained before the creation of these modern vil-
lage governments. Prior village-wide control, election of representa-
tives, and other formal recognition of a government did not exist.
Claims by contemporary Native groups that an historical, unbroken
sovereignty existed have never been substantiated. The major prob-
lem for these entities arises from the substantial difference in word-
ing between the original section 16 of the IRA granting tribal status,
and the subsequent Alaskan amendment." 9
Under the original section of the act, all "tribes or bands" of
Indians situated upon reservation lands were afforded tribal sta-
tus. 20 When the IRA was extended to Alaska, the language was
significantly expanded. 2' The only requirement Alaskan groups
must meet in order to receive IRA benefits is that "groups of Indians
in Alaska ...[have] a common bond of occupation, or association,
or residence within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or ru-
116. See supra notes 62-63.
117. See supra notes 62-63.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 52-97.
119. See supra notes 38-39.
120. See supra note 38.
121. See supra notes 39-41.
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ral district." '122 This difference in language allows the Alaskan Na-
tive groups to band together on any number of grounds: business
purposes, occupational reasons (fishing villages, etc.), or merely out
of social convenience. In comparison to the original provision, the
Alaskan amendment does not maintain a requirement that a "band
or tribe" exist.
Alaskan groups are left to argue that the Alaskan amendment to
the IRA allows for full tribal recognition of the state's numerous
Native villages. The primary purpose of the IRA amendment was to
allow groups of Indians who were not recognized as tribes to organ-
ize under the statute in order to qualify for land grants and other
benefits. Hence, meeting the "common bond" criteria for recognition
as an IRA council does not afford tribal status' to a Native entity
as provided for under the original provision.
B. "Indian Country" Status of Alaskan Native Indian Groups
In a situation where an Alaskan Native entity has been able to
establish tribal status, the requirement for occupation of Indian
country is the next major obstacle to overcome in obtaining sovereign
recognition. All Alaskan Native Indian groups will have difficulty
overcoming the traditional "on-reservation/off-reservation" test." 4
Since Alaska became a state in 1959 the "on-reservation/off-
reservation" distinction has been consistently applied in various ju-
risdictions whenever the issue of Native sovereign rights has
arisen."' Those off-reservation villages that are predominantly In-
dian in composition, as distinct from non-Indian communities, and
which maintain IRA councils, have been held not to possess Indian
country status. 2 A basis for sovereign authority was not recognized
where an Alaskan Native group existed as an off-reservation Indian
community.
Case law has never recognized Indian country as existing in
Alaska. 1 7 This has been the precedent for over 80 years.128 Only
122. See supra notes 39-41.
123. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 751.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 58-78.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 58-78.
126. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
127. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252).
128. See In re Carr, 5 F. Gas 115 (D. Or. 1875) (No. 2,432); Waters v Campbell, 29 F.
Gas. 412 (C. C. D. Or. 1875) (No. 17,265); United States v. Williams, 2 F. 61, 62 (C. C. D.
Or. 1880); United States v. Stephens, 12 F. 52 (C. C. D. Or. 1882); Kie v. United States, 27
F. 351 (C. C. D. Or. 1886); In re Sah Quah,1'1 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886); In re Petition of
Can-Ah-Couqua, 29 F. 687 (D. Alaska 1887); Tla-Koo-Yel-Lee v. United States, 167 U.S.
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one case has ever recognized the existence of Indian country in
Alaska." 9 That case has been narrowly construed and has never
been followed in subsequent rulings. "
This precedent makes it apparent that decisions regarding the
issue of Native authority (versus State authority) have been based
upon the recognized tribe proving reservation status or similar fed-
eral intent to provide for the Native group. Failure to substantiate
occupation of reservation lands affords a tribe no sovereign power
unless it can prove it is located on some other type of off-reservation
Indian country. "
Off-reservation Indian country has been recognized in
Alaska. " 2 However, the federal government has consistently refused
to recognize governmental powers as existing in off-reservation Na-
tive entities. Congress and the executive branch have determined that
Alaskan Natives possess no governmental powers except on reserva-
tion lands unless expressly provided for within the scope of a partic-
ular statute.1 88
The government has manifested its intent that Native village
affairs on off-reservation lands be controlled by local governments
created by law."" Modern enactments by both state legislatures and
Congress continue to establish the government's position that organ-
ized Native communities are not sovereign."' The Alaskan State-
274 (1897); United States v. Doo-Noch-Keen, 2 Alaska 624 (D. Alaska 1905); United States
v. Sitarangok, 4 Alaska 667 (D. Alaska 1913); Parks v. Parks, 6 Alaska 426 (D. Alaska 1921).
129. See Petitions of McCord and Nickanorka, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957).
130. The judge who wrote the opinions in McCord and Nickanorka cautioned:
This decision should not be interpreted by members of the native groups, be
they Indian or Eskimo, as a general removal of the territorial penal authority
over them, for the reason that this court will take judicial notice that there are
few tribal organizations in Alaska that are functioning strictly within Indian
country as defined in 18 U.S.C.§ 1151 et seq.
151 F. Supp. at 136 (emphasis added).
131. The other types of "Indian country" recognized by statute are "allotments" and
"dependent Indian communities." See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1151, 62 Stat. 757).
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1953); United States v. Chavez,
290 U.S. 357 (1933).
133. The opinions of members of the executive branch must be placed in proper per-
spective. The opinions of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, charged with administering the
majority of Indian laws, carry substantial weight as to the precise meaning of those laws.
Naturally the opinions of lower federal officials should be accorded less weight than those at
the secretarial level. Ultimately, however, it is for the courts to decide what authority has been
conveyed or denied by reviewing particular pieces of legislation. Opinions of bureaucrats carry
no more than persuasive weight.
134. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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hood Act" 6 contains provisions for certain enclaves of exclusive fed-
eral authority, but contains no parallel provisions for Native
enclaves. Native enclaves could easily have been created had the gov-
ernment intended to establish such sovereign Native authority.
Further, Congress has approved the Alaskan Constitution "'
with its provision limiting local government authority to state-
chartered cities and boroughs (counties).3 8 This approval makes the
state legislature the governing body outside organized cities and
boroughs. " 9
Perhaps the most obvious illustration of Congressional intent
refusing to allow off-reservation villages to be self-governing enclaves
is the important Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). °
The modern ANCSA contains numerous provisions which maintain
that all off-reservation communities in Alaska are subject to state
law without any independent legal authority. 14 '
The ANCSA manifests that Congress intended complete state
regulatory authority over virtually all Native-owned lands and Na-
tive corporations.1 2 The ANCSA also includes mandated involve-
ment by state or state-chartered municipalities into the affairs of all
Native villages. " There is no mention, whatsoever, in any portion
136. See supra note 63.
137. See supra note 63.
138. Applicable sections of the Alaska state constitution include:
"Sources of Government. All political power is inherent in the people. All government
originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good
of the people as a whole." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 2.
"Assembly; Petition. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government shall never be abridged." ALASKA CONsT. art. 1, § 6.
From these sections of the constitution numerous statutes and case decisions have been
developed which limit the authority of both state and tribal governments.
139. See supra note 72.
140. See supra note 76.
141. Congress declared its position in the ANCSA in its "Declaration of Policy":
Congress finds and declares that ...
(b) [Tihe settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conform-
ity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with
maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and prop-
erty, without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights,
privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation system or lengthy ward-
ship or trusteeship, and without adding to the categories of property and institu-
tions enjoying special tax privileges or to the legislation establishing special rela-
tionships between the United States Government and the State of Alaska. ...
Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1971)). See also
F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 739-50.
142. See supra notes 4, 72, 73; see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, § 3(c), §
4(b), § 14(c)(3), 85 Stat. 688 (1971); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603(c), 1604(b), 1614(c)(3) (1982).
143. 43 U.S.C. § 1614(c)(3) (1982).
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of the ANCSA, of the ability of an unincorporated village or an IRA
council to play a governmental role or to be afforded sovereign
powers.
Additionally, an Alaskan Native Indian village attempting to
fulfill the Indian country requirement by declaring itself a "depen-
dent Indian community" '4 must meet stringent qualifications. Two
cases have established the concept of Indian country for modern Fed-
eral Indian law."4 These cases involved Native villages which were
the functional equivalent of reservations, but had not been so desig-
nated. Both Native communities were examined in light of legislative
intent to treat them as such. 14"
The two cases established that Alaskan Native Indian groups
claiming "dependent" status must meet the burden of proving that
Congress has specifically set aside tribal land, or other federal lands,
for Indian use. 14 7 This has been an infrequent act by Congress. In
addition, these Alaskan Native groups must substantiate the allega-
tion that any setting aside was with the intent of protecting and car-
ing for the Indians who remain dependent on the federal
government.' 4"
It appears that Alaskan Native groups cannot meet this criteria
by occupying land acquired through the ANCSA. The ANCSA
lands were not set aside for Indian protection.149 This is illustrated
by the fact that these allotments are freely alienable. The allotments
were given to the Alaskan Natives as consideration for extinguish-
ment of claims to other state lands. Congress made clear its policy
that conveyances of ANCSA lands did not subsequently convey sov-
ereign powers.' 50
C. Sovereign Powers Which an Off-Reservation Alaskan Native
Tribe Possesses May Be Limited In Scope
In the event an Alaskan Native Indian group succeeds in fulfil-
ling both the tribal status requirements and the Indian country re-
144. See supra note 65.
145. See supra note 66.
146. See supra note 66.
147. See supra note 66.
148. See supra note 66.
149. ANCSA lands were not set aside for Indian protection, and in fact are freely alien-
able. The Native communities are in no sense dependent upon the federal government. There
is no federal agent or superintendent in charge. The lands which were granted through the
ANCSA are not "in trust" and the Native villages are not Indian "reservations." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 746, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1972).
150. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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quirements, there remains no guarantee of unlimited sovereign au-
thority. Completion of the two-part test does not automatically allot
a Native group the authority of a reservation government.
Though such an entity may attempt to claim certain minor sov-
ereign powers, the right to claim absolute sovereignty has no basis
under present legislation. No authority has ever held that Congress
intended occupants of all differing types of Indian country be af-
forded identical governmental powers.1"" Reservation governments
are entities which have been recognized as possessing sovereign pow-
ers, though those powers too may be limited in scope. "' All author-
ity points towards a conclusion that Congress intended different
levels of authority to exist on different types of Indian country.
D. Recent Decision
The recent case, Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Manage-
ment and Planning," ' previously outlined in this comment, pro-
vides an excellent illustration. The case involves an Alaskan Native
group claiming immunity from suit. It has been established by legis-
lative policy that only on-reservation tribal governments have exclu-
sive jurisdiction. Off-reservation Native tribes may not assert immu-
nity from suit. Though a Native tribe's off-reservation allotment or
dependent community falls within the definition of Indian country, it
does not possess authority to claim immunity from suit. Claims to
absolute sovereign power, such as immunity from suit, are
unsubstantiated.154
Alaskan Native Indian groups existing outside reservation lands
generally fall under state jurisdiction to the same extent as non-Na-
tives.' Matters which would normally be addressed by tribal gov-
ernments on a reservation lands are handled by state regulation on
allotments and other types of Indian country beyond the jurisdiction
of reservation governments. 5
Cases and statutes maintain that an Alaskan off-reservation
tract is not an enclave in which a tribal government can limit state
jurisdiction. Absolute sovereign powers have not been afforded. An
Alaskan Native group, recognized as a tribe and occupying some
151. See supra note 23.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 12-71.
153. No. S-1345 (Alaska 1988).
154. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 23 and 77.
156. See supra note 77.
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type of Indian country, possesses only limited rights and powers.15
In its May 20, 1988 opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court pro-
vided an excellent synopsis of Native sovereign rights as applied to
Alaskan aborigines. The review began with Alaska's Treaty of Ces-
sion and continued through modern statutory reforms. The Court
reviewed cases from throughout the United States which dealt with
Native claims of immunity from suit and tribal authority. Justice
Matthews, writing for the court, then turned his attention to specific
Alaska cases such as Metlukatla Indian Community v. Egan,
United States v. Seveloff and In re Sah Quah, all previously dis-
cussed in this comment.
The Alaska court also reviewed the effects of the Indian Reor-
ganization Act (IRA) " on Native lands in Alaska and reached a
conclusion similar to that discussed earlier. The conclusion was that
the IRA, by allowing groups of Natives to band together and adopt
constitutions and bylaws, does not also afford sovereign powers. The
IRA provided a means of allowing Alaskan Native communities to
"revitalize their self-government . . . through the creation of
chartered corporations with power to conduct the business and eco-
nomic affairs of the tribe."'' " It is apparent that this grant of corpo-
rate authority is not the equivalent of a grant of governmental privi-
leges and immunities.
Congress believed that the power to set up a system of local
government was only appropriate on reservation lands.' 6 The Inte-
rior Department's instructions concerning the IRA provide in part:
"The power to prescribe ordinances for civil government, relating
particularly to law and order, may extend only to such lands as may
be held as an Indian reservation for the use of the community."''
The procedure under the IRA for allowing Native groups to
obtain sovereign powers by establishing existence on reservation
lands seems inappropriate in light of the historical development of
157. The Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe trend has been away from the idea of inherent
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemp-
tion .. " McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
158. 49 Stat. 1250 (1936).
159. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 151.
160. Secretary of the Interior's letter to the House Committee on Indian Affairs accom-
panying the IRA bill provides in part: "[I]f native governments of Alaska are to set up systems
of local government, it will be necessary to stipulate the geographical limits of their jurisdic-
tion. Reservations set up by the Secretary of the Interior will accomplish this." H.R. REP. No.
2447, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3-5 (1936).
161. Department of Interior, Instruction for Organizations in Alaska Under the Reor-
ganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984) and The Alaska Act of May 1, 1936 (49 Stat.
1250) and The Amendments Thereto, Instruction I(n) (Dec. 22, 1937).
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Alaskan Native lands. Alaskan Natives have never established reser-
vation status due to the federal government's lack of desire and ne-
cessity to grant lands to Alaskan Natives. Therefore, it seems appar-
ent that no Alaskan Native group would be able to establish itself as
possessing any sovereign rights under the IRA guidelines.
Lastly, the court reviewed the ANCSA and likewise concluded
that by granting fee simple title in Native lands to regional and vil-
lage corporations, sovereign powers were not correspondingly
granted. Thus, the grant of lands did not equate to a grant of gov-
ernmental authority.
The Alaska Supreme Court summarized that the intent of Con-
gress through various statutes has apparently been to deny Native
groups sovereign authority unless reservation status is established." 2
However, considering the lack of reservation lands in Alaska and the
obvious reluctance of the federal government to provide for such
lands, the court provides no insight as to the methods for establishing
reservation status (i.e., sovereign powers) by any Alaskan Native
group. Hence, without reservation status it becomes virtually impos-
sible for a Native group to acquire any degree of sovereign authority.
V. PROPOSAL TO ADOPT A "SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE"
DOCTRINE TO ASSIST THE JUDICIARY IN RESOLUTION OF THE
ALASKAN NATIVE INDIAN DILEMMA
The Alaska Supreme Court has again been afforded an oppor-
tunity to resolve the Native sovereignty issue.1 8 Current legislative
policy is in favor of a lessening of control by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs over Native governments and to give substance to the goal of
Indian self-determination. " Utilization of a "substantial compli-
ance" doctrine 1 5 would be of monumental assistance to those Alas-
kan Native Indian groups seeking to assert their sovereign rights.
Those Alaskan Native groups able to substantially comply with
the "tribe" and "Indian country" requirements would receive a
granting of sovereign powers and privileges (and the corresponding
burdens) equivalent to the degree of compliance which the group can
substantiate. The greater the degree of compliance with the statutory
162. See supra note 153.
163. Native Village of Stevens, No. S-1345 (Alaska 1988).
164. 1978 UNITED STATES CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7782.
165. The doctrine of "substantial compliance" exists in many areas of law. See Inter-
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 259 Ky. 677, 83 S.W. 2d 11, 14 (1935) (a discussion of
substantial compliance with an insurance policy so as to receive the benefits of the policy); see
also C.J.S. § 508 for an explanation of substantial performance in the contract setting.
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and case law provisions, the greater the degree of sovereign authority
afforded.
The rationale behind allowing Alaskan Native Indian groups to
conform to a lesser standard is based upon the need to acknowledge
the different manner in which these groups historically evolved.
Alaskan Native groups evolved in a manner unique to all Indian
groups. Due to the late arrival of white settlers and the lack of for-
mal governmental relations with the United States, a structured po-
litical loyalty to the tribe has not evolved.166 Loyalty was instead
focused upon the family unit or clan.'
The substantial compliance doctrine allows the judiciary the
continuity of applying a reliable and recognized standard while only
altering the outcome in cases involving Alaskan Native groups able
to meet at least a majority of the necessary requirements. The adop-
tion of this substantial compliance doctrine would undoubtedly re-
quire Congressional initiative to insure adherence to the intent of the
federal government. A statutory amendment allowing for utilization
of the substantial compliance doctrine in cases involving Alaskan
Native Indian groups would alleviate the problem.
Initiating a substantial compliance doctrine is arguably
favorable to a proposal requiring the courts to examine the entire
political development of Alaskan Native groups. 6' The doctrine
would allow the courts to maintain utilization of the traditional test
without exhibiting prejudice toward the developmental differences of
the Alaskan Native groups.
Alaskan Native groups would be held to standards comparable
to those of other aboriginal peoples throughout the United States.
Formally recognized Indian tribes in every state have been required
to meet the criteria of the traditional test. Partial fulfillment of the
criteria would provide Alaskan Native groups with only limited sov-
ereign power. Adopting the substantial compliance doctrine would
alleviate the problem of allowing Alaskan Native Indian groups the
benefits of complete sovereignty by testing them under a completely
different set of criteria.
An attempt to provide a new and innovative test, specifically
166. See Note, supra note 96, at 375.
167. See Note, supra note 96, at 375.
168. Marston suggests that the difference in the evolution of the Alaskan Native Indian
groups requires the development of an entirely new test. The new test would be based upon
the substantive differences of the Alaskan groups. The judiciary would be required to com-




applicable to Alaskan Native Indian groups, is contrary to legislative
policy. The traditional test has been thoroughly established and con-
sistently applied for decades. An attempt to establish new criteria for
use in a specific instance would lead to inconsistent judicial results.
Implementation of a new test based on Alaskan Natives' unique
development would undoubtedly open the door to original and inno-
vative criteria from Indian groups across the nation who have previ-
ously been denied sovereign recognition. Natives in each state seek-
ing sovereign authority could easily substantiate any number of
reasons why their particular Native group evolved historically in a
situation as "unique" as the Alaskan Native groups. With each va-
ried scenario the Native group would demand application of its own
"test." The possibilities for endless confusion and inconsistency are
clearly apparent.
The Legislature and the judiciary have maintained a desire for
disciplined, logical, and consistent reasoning. Hence, there has arisen
the evolution and development of the traditional "tribe/Indian coun-
try" test through both statutes and case law precedent. To apply a
new test to the Alaskan scenario would take away from the con-
tinuity and consistency which the traditional test provides. Applica-
tion of a "substantial compliance" doctrine in conjunction with the
traditional "tribe-Indian country" test leads to full and fair enforce-
ment of legislative intent and provides for consistent legislative
results.
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional test for recognition as a sovereign Native entity
demands two elements: (1) establishment of tribal status, and (2) oc-
cupation of "Indian country." These criteria have been developed by
both legislative and judicial processes. This traditional two-part test
has been applied consistently in all states where the issue of Native
Indian sovereignty has arisen.
The traditional test, in conjunction with a "substantial compli-
ance" doctrine, should be applied to Alaskan Native Indian groups
claiming sovereign authority. The intent of both the Alaska state leg-
islature and Congress can be assured only by application of the
traditional test. To allow new and innovative criteria to be applied to
each Native Indian group seeking sovereign rights would lead to se-
vere problems concerning judicial precedent. The traditional "tribe-
Indian country" test has provided a strong basis for resolving Native
claims to sovereign authority in past decisions and should be applied
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in a modified manner to the Alaskan Native Indian groups to ensure
continued enforcement of legislative intent.
Paul A. Matteoni
